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A Small Discovery: Avicenna’s 
Theory of Minima Naturalia
J o n  M c G i n n i S *
abstract There has been a long-held misconception among historians of 
philosophy and science that apart from brief comments in Aristotle and Averroes, 
the theory of minima naturalia had to await Latin Schoolmen for its full articulation. 
Recently scholars have shown that far from sporadic comments on minima naturalia, 
Averroes in fact had a fully developed and well-integrated theory of them. in this 
study, i complement these scholars’ important work by considering Avicenna’s place 
in the history and development of the doctrine of the minima naturalia. There is no 
study to date that mentions Avicenna in connection with this doctrine despite the 
fact that he dedicated an entire chapter to it in his Physics, yet Avicenna’s account is 
at least as developed as and even better integrated than Averroes’s presentation. The 
present study situates Avicenna’s position within the more general history of atomism, 
and introduces Avicenna’s “new argument” for natural minima. The argument is 
important not only for its novelty but also because it shows how Avicenna integrated 
Aristotle’s account of minima naturalia into a theory of mixture as well.
keywords Avicenna/ibn Sīnā, Minima naturalia, Atomism, continuity/
continuum, Mixture
the theory of minima naturalia is loosely one of atoms;* however, unlike the 
atoms of Democritus, the minimal parts of Epicurus, or the indivisible substances 
of the Mutakallimu¯n, all of which are physically and conceptually indivisible, minima 
naturalia, while being physically indivisible, can be divided at least conceptually ad 
infinitum.1 Until recently, historians of science believed that with the exception of 
some passing remarks in Aristotle and some brief exegesis by Greek commentators 
in the ancient world and then Averroes in the islamic world, the details of a theory 
of minima naturalia had to await the Latin Schoolmen of the thirteenth century. 
* Jon McGinnis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri–St. Louis.
* i would like to thank all the participants at the Avicenna conference in Park city, UT (June, 
2010) for their questions and comments on an earlier version of this paper. i am additionally extremely 
grateful to Taneli Kukkonen, Peter Adamson, and an anonymous JHP reviewer for their incisive and 
insightful comments. As always, any mistakes are wholly my own.
1 While there is a debate whether Democritean atoms should be considered both physically and 
conceptually indivisible, there is no question about whether the Epicurean and kala¯m sorts are both. For 
a discussion of the debate concerning Democritus, see Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 354–57.
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Ruth Glasner in two groundbreaking works has shown that, far from having just 
sketchy and sporadic comments about minima naturalia, Averroes had a fully 
developed and well-integrated theory of them.2 Unlike earlier historians of science, 
whose understanding of Averroes’s physical theory has been limited to the Latin 
translation of his great commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Glasner consulted all 
three of Averroes’s Physics commentaries—short, middle, and long—which requires 
an appreciation of not only Latin, but also Arabic and Hebrew. As a result of 
Glasner’s careful studies, and even more recently that of cristina cerami, we now 
have a more complete picture of both Averroes’s understanding of the minima 
naturalia and his place in the history of atomism.
in this study, i want to complement this important work by considering 
Avicenna’s place in the history and development of the doctrine of the minima 
naturalia. There is no study to date that mentions Avicenna in connection with 
this doctrine despite the fact that he dedicated an entire chapter to the subject in 
his Physics.3 This omission is no doubt due in large part to the fact that the section 
where Avicenna discusses this issue was not translated into Latin. Yet Avicenna’s 
account is at least as developed and perhaps even better integrated than Averroes’s 
presentation. (i say ‘better integrated’ because Avicenna was not limited by the 
commentary genre that Averroes favored, and so had more freedom to bring 
things together when and where he saw fit.) in order to situate and to appreciate 
Avicenna’s contribution, then, i begin with a very brief historiography, followed by a 
short history of minima naturalia, starting with the locus classicus in Aristotle’s Physics 
and going through Aristotle’s Greek commentators, with a particular emphasis on 
John Philoponus. The majority of this study is a presentation of the theory and 
philosophy behind Avicenna’s understanding of the minima naturalia that considers 
what he took from his predecessors as well as what is novel in his theory. i hope to 
show that despite the neglect that Avicenna has received concerning his place in 
the history of atomism, he was in fact a pioneer in this subject and actually laid the 
groundwork from which Averroes, and indirectly subsequent Latin Schoolmen, 
developed their accounts of a natural minimum.
1 .  h i s t o r i o g r a p h y
Historians of science have not represented the contributions of natural 
philosophers working on the notion of minima naturalia in Arabic adequately.4 
Pierre Duhem in his grand Le système du monde has only one sentence in which 
he mentions Averroes’s supposed lack of interest in the topic,5 and the usually 
thorough Anneliese Maier wholly neglects the contribution of Muslim thinkers 
2 Glasner, “ibn Rushd’s theory of minima naturalia,” and Averroes’ Physics.
3 Avicenna, Physics, iii.12; the numeric references to Avicenna’s works are book number (in Ro-
man numerals), followed by a period and then chapter number (in Arabic). in those cases where this 
number is followed by a comma and then another Arabic numeral, the second number refers to the 
paragraph number in the editions of Avicenna’s works from The islamic Translation Series. 
4 For a brief study of the historiography of minima naturalia, see Murdoch, “The Medieval and 
Renaissance Tradition of Minima Naturalia,” 91–131, esp., 91–96.
5 Ce texte ne semble guère avoir retenu l’attention d’Averroès, car celui-ci se borne à écrire, en son commentaire: 
“il est manifeste de soi que le volume de la chair est limité en grandeur comme en petitesse” (Duhem, Le système 
du monde, Vii.42).
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on this topic.6 Andrew G. van Melsen dedicated approximately two pages of his 
study on atomism, From Atomos to Atom, to Averroes’s account available in Latin.7 
norma Emerton likewise reserved about as much space in her work The Scientific 
Reinterpretation of Form to Averroes’s theory of minima naturalia, but now with an eye 
to how that theory was linked with another important medieval debate—namely, 
the theory of mixtion or primary mixture.8
Ruth Glasner is the first to begin giving philosophers working in the medieval 
islamic world their due on this subject. in both an article and chapter of her 
book, Averroes’ Physics, she chronicles Averroes’s place in the history of the minima 
naturalia. ostensibly, Averroes’s account of the minima naturalia was, Glasner tells 
us, an attempt to reconcile seemingly contradictory claims in Aristotle’s Physics. The 
first such claim is Aristotle’s criticism of Democritean atomism, which committed 
Aristotle to the belief that all natural magnitudes are continuous and so potentially 
divisible infinitely. The second is Aristotle’s critique of Anaxagoras, in which he 
maintains that there is a limit beyond which natural substances cannot be further 
divided.9 Even more recently cristina cerami, while challenging some of Glasner’s 
claims, has further extended our knowledge of Averroes’s theory of the minima 
naturalia.10 in none of the works of this set of historians, starting with Duhem and 
going through Glasner and cerami, is there ever mention of Avicenna’s place in 
this history. Before i can tell his story, however, i need to begin by relating the 
origins of the idea of minima naturalia in, first, Aristotle, and then some of his later 
Greek commentators, most notably John Philoponus.
2 .  a  h i s t o r y  o f  m i n i m a  n a t u r a l i a  i n  t h e  g r e e k 
w o r l d
Aristotle introduces the idea of natural minima (elachista) at Physics 1.4, which 
became the locus classicus for the doctrine of minima naturalia. in that passage, 
he critiques Anaxagoras’s principle that “everything is in everything.”11 Arguably, 
Aristotle’s most important proof concerning minima naturalia runs thus:
if the part can be indefinitely big or small—i call a ‘part’ the ingredient into which 
the whole is divided—then necessarily the thing itself can be too. So if it is impossible 
that an animal or plant be indefinitely big or small, then clearly the part is not such 
as [to be indefinitely big or small] either, for the whole also will be such. now, flesh, 
bone, and the like are parts of an animal, and fruits [the parts] of a plant. Hence, it 
is clear that flesh, bone, and the rest cannot be indefinitely big in the direction of 
greater or smaller. (Physics 41.4, 187b13–21)12
Aristotle’s thesis is that the parts that constitute natural kinds—parts such as flesh, 
blood, bone, fruits, and the like—have a definite limit with respect to their size, 
6 Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, 179–96.
7 Van Melsen, From Atomos to Atom, 58–60.
8 Emerton, The Scientific Reinterpretation of Form, 87–88.
9 Glasner, “ibn Rushd’s Theory of mimina naturalia,” 10–14.
10 cerami, “Mélange.”
11 For a discussion of Anaxagoras’s principles, see Drozdek, “Anaxagoras and the Everything in 
Everything Principle.”
12 All translations, whether Greek or Arabic, are my own.
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both in greatness and smallness, namely, a minimum and maximum. The argument 
for this thesis—limiting the present discussion merely to the idea of minima—is 
straightforward enough. Aristotle takes it as impossible that cats, for example, 
should be indefinitely small. Thus, any premise that leads to the possibility of 
indefinitely small cats must be false. if Anaxagoras is correct, and everything is in 
everything such that it is possible, at least in principle, to extract out from a given 
substance indefinitely small cat flesh, cat blood, and all the sundry cat organs and 
bits, then these indefinitely small cat parts should, again in principle, be able to 
constitute an indefinitely small cat. Since the assumption is that indefinitely small 
cats are impossible, the premise that gave rise to the absurdity, namely, that there 
are indefinitely small traces of everything in everything, Aristotle concludes, must 
be false. Later in the same passage, the existence of minima naturalia plays an 
essential role in two other arguments against Anaxagoras, but in those passages 
Aristotle takes the existence of minima naturalia as demonstrated, presumably on 
the strength of the argument that i have just presented.13
According to the medieval Arabic bibliographers, al-nadīm and al-Qif.ti, 
commentaries on book i of the Physics by the later Greek commentators, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and John Philoponus were available in 
Arabic translation. Thus, in addition to Aristotle’s own Physics, these are likely the 
Greek works to have influenced the understanding concerning minima naturalia 
of subsequent natural philosophers working within the medieval islamic milieu. 
of these, Alexander’s commentary is no longer extant in either Greek or Arabic, 
with Simplicius preserving only fragments of it in his own Physics commentary. 
Additionally, there are a few scattered fragments of Alexander’s commentary 
extant in Arabic but none from book 1.14 As for Themistius’s Paraphrase, it remains 
fairly close to Aristotle’s text. in contrast, Philoponus’s commentary exists both in 
Greek and Arabic and is somewhat extensive.15
in addition to the Physics 1.4 passage, which is Aristotle’s clearest statement 
concerning minima naturalia, scholars also see the doctrine hiding behind 
Aristotle’s comments in On Generation and Corruption 1.10 and in On Sense and 
Sensibilia 6. On Generation and Corruption 1.10 includes Aristotle’s theory of primary 
mixture—what historians of science sometimes refer to as mixtion. As will become 
apparent, this passage seemed to exert some influence on Avicenna’s theory of 
minima naturalia. As for the fate of On Generation and Corruption in the Arabic 
world, unlike the Physics, the Arabic translation of that text is no longer extant. 
in addition to the work itself, al-nadīm and al-Qif.ti mention the commentaries 
of, again, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and John Philoponus. of these, 
Themistius’s commentary is not extant. Alexander’s commentary was thought to be 
lost, but an Arabic translation of On Generation and Corruption 2.2–5 was preserved 
in the alchemical work, Kit¯ab al-Ta.srīf (Book of Transformation), of Ja¯bir ibn  .Hayya¯n 
(721–815), but again it would seem nothing concerning our passage remains.16 
13 See Aristotle, Physics 187b27–32 and 187b35–188a2.
14 See Giannakis, “Fragments from Alexander’s Lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.”
15 Philoponus (=Ya.hyá), In Phys.
16 See Gannagé, “Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise In de generatione et corruptione,” and 
On Aristotle’s on coming-to-be and Perishing 2.2–5.
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Finally, while the Arabic translation of Philoponus’s commentary of On Generation 
and Corruption is no longer extant, the complete text still exists in Greek.17 As for 
On Sense and Sensibilia, al-nadīm claims that the work was unknown even at the end 
of the tenth century. Still, there appears to be evidence that Avicenna had access 
to some form of it, although whether this text influenced his theory of minima 
naturalia is perhaps impossible to say.18
in light of the foregoing, Philoponus’s discussions of the relevant passages 
are clearly the most complete and latest of the Greek commentaries, and thus 
incorporate many of the earlier advances on the topic of the minima naturalia. 
Moreover, Philoponus’s commentary (certainly his Physics commentary) had the 
greatest apparent influence on Avicenna’s understanding of Aristotelian physics. 
Hence, i focus primarily upon Philoponus’s account of natural minima.
The most notable advancement in Philoponus’s commentary is that he shifts 
the discussion from natural substances and their parts to the form (eidos) of those 
substances and their parts. This shift does not appear to be new to Philoponus. 
Themistius occasionally mentions form in his exposition of our passage.19 in fact, 
the introduction of form may go back as far as Alexander of Aphrodisias, since 
Simplicius suggests that Alexander and Themistius interpreted Aristotle similarly.20 
The introduction of form is probably part of the commentators’ larger project of 
developing an integrated Aristotelian physics. So, for example, in his On Generation 
and Corruption 1.10 commentary, Philoponus situates Aristotle’s discussion of 
mixture within the broader context of refuting Anaxogoras’s principle, “Everything 
is in everything,” and Philoponus’s theory of mixture developed there presupposes 
the account of form presented in arguing for minima naturalia, a point to which 
i return below.21
Turning to Philoponus’s version of the argument for minima naturalia, he 
begins by claiming, “Every form naturally subsists in some definite quantity, and 
it is neither naturally augmented to just any degree of largeness nor naturally 
diminished to just any degree of smallness, but rather there is a certain boundary 
to greater and smaller beyond which the form does not exist.”22
Philoponus next attempts, in perhaps a not altogether successful way, to defend 
his newly modified major premise, namely, that the form cannot exist beyond a 
certain natural maximal and minimal quantity. This defense itself goes beyond 
Aristotle, for Aristotle merely asserted that natural substances could not be of 
17 Philoponus, In Gen. et Corr.
18 See Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, s.v. “Liber Sensus et Sensati,” 45–47.
19 Themistius, In Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis, 14, 25–26 and 15, 13–16.
20 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Priores Commentaria, 169, 5–25. Unfortunately, 
while Simplicius quotes Alexander extensively, there is no mention of Alexander’s using form in his 
interpretation. Still, such an absence need not be an indicator that Alexander did not re-frame the 
argument in terms of form, since Simplicius’s emphasis in quoting Alexander is on the apparent fact 
that Alexander’s version of Aristotle’s Physics differed from that of Simplicius’s own.
21 For the significance of Anaxagoras’s principle, see Philoponus, In De Gen. et Corr., 192, 10–16; 
and the same for the attenuation or reduction of form; and Philoponus, In De Gen. et Corr., 198, 18–19, 
for form’s need of a minimum quantity. Discussions of Philoponus’s theory of mixture can be found 
in De Haas, “Mixture in Philoponus,” and Wood and Weisberg, “interpreting Aristotle on Mixture.”
22 Philoponus, In Phys., 96, 27–30.
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just any size whatsoever. in the case of a maximum, Philoponus claims that the 
form fades, or becomes attenuated (exite¯la), the more it must spread throughout 
a given quantity.
indeed no human [for example] would come to be a hundred feet or equal to the 
size of the cosmos; for we are not assuming some human in thought but in reality. 
clearly, then, [a real human] cannot be augmented to just any size and beyond 
all. instead, there is a certain limited size beyond which [a real human] cannot be 
augmented, for the form extended over a large subject becomes attenuated. (Philoponus, In 
Phys., 97, 4–9; emphasis added)
Presumably, then, there are decided maxima beyond which forms simply perish, 
as the drop of wine perishes as it spreads throughout 10,000 gallons of water.23 
Philoponus next posits that just as there is a maximum, so there must be a 
minimum quantity beyond which form cannot exist. it should be noted, however, 
that he merely asserts this last point and does not provide an argument for it; for 
the attenuation argument that he used to justify a natural maximum clearly is 
inapplicable to minima, and, if anything, there would be a concentration of the 
form.
Philoponus next turns to a mathematically motivated objection to the idea of 
minima naturalia. This objection presupposes Aristotle’s discussion of whether 
magnitudes are continuous or discrete from Physics 6, and so we should briefly 
linger over this issue. The driving question of Physics 6 is whether magnitudes 
such as distance, motion, and time are continuous, and so are potentially 
divisible ad infinitum, or whether they are discrete such that a process of division 
ultimately terminates in certain indivisible parts or atoms. Despite what we have 
seen in Aristotle’s Physics 1.4 concerning his belief in minima naturalia, Aristotle 
unequivocally denies that magnitudes are composed of atoms, and instead holds 
that all magnitudes must be continuous, and so potentially divisible infinitely. 
Moreover, unlike his passing remarks concerning minima naturalia, Aristotle 
spends all of Physics 6 engaged in, at times, highly technical argumentation that 
magnitudes must be continuous.
Given the seeming discrepancies between Physics 1.4 and book 6, the objection 
that Philoponus considers is a pressing one. it runs thus:24 since all magnitudes are 
continuous and so potentially divisible ad infinitum, let the purported minimum 
amount of flesh, for example, be divided. The resultants of the division are either 
themselves flesh or they are not flesh. if they are flesh, then there are quantities 
of flesh less than the minimum amount of flesh, which is absurd. “if the divided 
things are not flesh, then how will they produce the composite flesh again? if 
the flesh is homoeomerous, clearly the parts of this would be flesh too.”25 This 
last horn of the dilemma, to which i return again when considering Avicenna’s 
account of minima naturalia, can be framed thus: if the resultants of the division 
are not flesh, then a composite of flesh would not be uniformly flesh through and 
23 Philoponus does not make this final point here, but the example and the assertion that forms 
require a certain quantity are given in Philoponus, In De Gen. et Corr., 198, 11–19.
24 Philoponus, In Phys., 98, 13–21.
25 Philoponus, In Phys., 98, 17–19.
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through, but instead would be a collection of distinct non-flesh parts, which the 
objector and Philoponus find absurd.26
Philoponus’s response to this objection again draws on his introduction of 
form to explain minima naturalia, for, says Philoponus, flesh can be considered 
either qua form or qua magnitude. Qua magnitude the flesh is continuous and so 
potentially divisible infinitely, in which case there is no minimal magnitude.27 This 
is all that Philoponus says here about division qua magnitude and unfortunately 
he leaves the notion of division (diairesis) underdetermined.28 Division here could 
mean physically dividing the magnitude into smaller and smaller portions or 
merely conceptually dividing the magnitude, as in the mathematical series 1, 1/2, 
1/4, 1/8, 1/16, . . . 1/2n . . . ∞. Since the mathematicians (hoi apo to¯n mathme¯to¯n) 
raise the puzzle, one might suspect that the latter form of division is meant, and 
yet when Philoponus turns to division qua form, it would seem that he intends 
physical division. i return to the suggestion that there are two distinct kinds of 
division when discussing Avicenna on division.
 As for division qua form, the flesh qua form is not infinitely divisible. Any 
division that results in a quantity less than that required for the subsistence of the 
form brings about the destruction of the form. To make his point graphically, he 
has us take as an example a human. on the one hand, we can consider the human 
qua magnitude as, for instance, 6 feet tall. in this case the individual can be divided 
into indefinitely smaller magnitudes: 3 feet, 18 inches, 9 inches, and so on. While 
there are smaller and smaller magnitudes, magnitude is never completely destroyed 
but always remains. on the other hand, if we consider the human qua (human) 
form, then, when we divide our ill-fated victim into feet, legs, torso, and head, we 
do not have smaller instances of the human form. We simply no longer have the 
form of human at all but instead a dismembered corpse. Species forms, in short, 
cannot survive division the way magnitudes can.
Similarly, says Philoponus, if there is to be flesh at all, that flesh requires the 
presence of the form of flesh, and the form of flesh is dependent upon some 
minimal quantity of matter. The inference is perhaps a bit too quick, for while it 
seems fairly obvious that the form of human is not fully localized in any part of 
the person, like the head, it is not equally clear that the form of flesh is not fully 
present in any bit of flesh regardless of how small. The problem is that even if one 
is convinced that Philoponus’s arguments work at the level of the species form, it is 
not as obvious how those arguments translate at the level of the forms of mixtures.
Whatever the limits of Philoponus’s argument, he has certainly gone beyond 
Aristotle and helped motivate Aristotle’s original argument. natural substance 
must have natural minima, since there are minimum quantities required for 
the subsistence of forms. As for how Philoponus’s version of the argument is an 
advancement over Aristotle’s original version, consider the following. Aristotle 
26 in fact, Aristotle also commits himself to the position that flesh, blood, and the like are uni-
formly flesh, blood, etc., through and through, when he develops his theory of primary mixture in 
On Generation and Corruption 1.10.
27 Philoponus, In Phys., 98, 21–2.
28 For a discussion of division within Philoponus, see De Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of 
Prime Matter, 116–20.
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frequently notes that substance (ousia) is said in three ways: matter, form, and 
the composite.29 Moreover, of these different ways of speaking of substance, 
there is a sense that substance-as-form is primary.30 Aristotle’s original argument, 
however, was solely in terms of natural (i.e. composite) substances. Thus, at the 
very least, Philoponus’s argument in terms of form is a generalization of Aristotle’s 
original argument, recasting it now in terms of the more general or basic notion 
of substance-as-form.
Still, there is also a sense in which Philoponus’s presentation might not be 
merely commentary but a new argument altogether. As noted above, a key element 
in Philoponus’s version of the argument is that the form fades and becomes 
attenuated. This conception of a form’s being able to fade is not unique to 
Philoponus’s Physics commentary but is found in other works by him as well. For 
example, in commenting On Generation and Corruption 1.10, Philoponus explains 
the difference between generation (genesis) and mixture (mixis/krama) thus:
concerning generation, the matter of the air [for example] is potentially air but 
actually water, while in a mixture what is mixed subsists potentially, not the matter 
itself but rather the very form is reduced [kekolasmena]. Because of this it is in potency, 
since it is neither pure nor such as it was before the mixing. (In De Gen. et Corr., 192, 
10–14; my emphasis)
it would seem that Philoponus has some idea of the intension and remission 
of (species!) forms.31 it would go well beyond the scope of the present paper 
to adjudicate as to whether Philoponus in fact has a doctrine of intension and 
remission of forms as well as whether the historical Aristotle may have held 
that theory. nonetheless, it is safe to say that if Philoponus’s theory of form is 
substantively different from Aristotle on this point (and my suspicion is that the 
two are different), then the present argument represents a creative moment in 
the history of atomism.32
3 .  t h e  a v i c e n n a n  b a c k g r o u n d  
t o  t h e  m i n i m a  n a t u r a l i a
The preceding discussion provides roughly the theory of minima naturalia as it 
appeared at the end of the late Antique Period and as it would have been passed 
on to the medieval islamic world. Turning now to Avicenna, his theory of minima 
naturalia comes at the end of book iii of his Physics, which as a whole is dedicated 
to the topic of discrete and continuous magnitudes. consequently, Avicenna’s 
account of minima naturalia presupposes two things: an understanding of his 
rejection of atomism—both as atomism was inherited from the Greek tradition 
29 Aristotle, De anima 2.1, 412a6–9; Metaphysics 7(Z).3, 1028b33–1029a3; and Metaphysics 8(H).1, 
1042a24–31. 
30 See, for instance, Metaphysics, 7(Z).3, 1029a26–33.
31 While the later medieval tradition certainly found the doctrine of insensio et remissio in the works 
of Aristotle, it was with respect to accidental forms. For the medieval Latin context see Sylla, “Medi-
eval concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The oxford calculators,” and The Oxford Calculators and the 
Mathematics of Motion, 1320–1350: Physics and Measurement by Latitudes; also see Dumont, “Godfrey of 
Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms.”
32 one study that touches on Philoponus’s theory of forms in a significant way is Macierowski and 
Hassing, “John Philoponus on Aristotle’s Definition of nature.”
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and more importantly as contemporary Muslim theologians conceived it—and 
an appreciation of his defense and (somewhat novel) understanding of the 
continuum. Thus, let me provide some background to his view concerning discrete 
and continuous magnitudes.
Perhaps the most important thing to bear in mind when considering Avicenna’s 
critique of atomism is the nature of the atoms that he wants to reject. He happily 
concedes that there might be bodies for which there are no physical means to 
divide them further. He thus recognizes that certain substances may as a matter of 
fact be indivisible, and so in a literal sense be atoms. The philosophically dubious 
atoms, at least by Avicenna’s lights, are those that are not only physically indivisible, 
but also, and more importantly, conceptually indivisible. These are the minimal 
parts of Epicurus and the indivisible parts of the islamic speculative theologians 
(al-juz’ alladhī la¯ yatajazza’u).33 Despite the fact that these atoms were believed to 
be conceptually indivisible, they were nonetheless thought to be space occupying 
(muta.hayīz). For many it might seem problematic to predicate of atoms both that 
they occupy space—and so, it would seem, are extended—and yet that they are 
conceptually indivisible. Be that as it may, there were a number of puzzles, involving 
purported absurdities surrounding continua and their infinite divisibility, that were 
quickly resolved if one had an ontology of discrete, that is, atomic, magnitudes.
As for the actual arguments that Avicenna uses to dismiss atomism and embrace 
continua, these need not bother us here.34 Suffice it to say that Avicenna believed 
that any purportedly indivisible magnitude could be divided into conceptually 
distinct parts. Moreover, he argued that without positing continua, the conclusions 
of Euclidean geometry could not even be approximated, and yet geometry was 
the most well established science of the time. Finally, as for the absurdities that 
seemingly arise from the infinite divisibility of continua, Avicenna maintained that 
once one properly understands the nature of the continuum, those absurdities 
are seen for the sophistries that they are. (i return to this final point at the end 
of this section.)
Thus, turning to Avicenna’s theory of the continuum, a complete account would 
require a discussion of his theory of matter, corporeality—or more exactly, the 
form of corporeality (.su¯rat al-jismīya)—and three-dimensionality, most of which 
would take me far afield from the issue of minima naturalia.35 instead, allow me 
to focus primarily on Avicenna’s fullest treatment of the continuum as it appears 
at Physics iii.2, with the occasional side remark about the other issues to clarify 
his discussion.36 While Physics iii.2 is Avicenna’s most detailed discussion of 
33 For Epicurus, see Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, and for the mutakallimu¯n, see Dhanani, 
The Physical Theory of Kala¯m, 90–140. For Avicenna’s knowledge of both Greek and islamic atomism, 
see Avicenna, Physics, iii.3.
34 See Avicenna, Physics, iii.4. For a study of Avicenna’s refutation of atomism, see Lettinck, “ibn 
Sīna¯ on Atomism.”
35 For discussions of the relation between matter and corporeality, see Avicenna, Physics, i.2, 4, and 
Metaphysics, ii.2–3. For studies see Hyman, “Aristotle’s ‘First Matter’ and Avicenna’s and Averroes’ ‘cor-
poreal Form,’” and Stone, “Simplicius and Avicenna on the Essential corporeity of Material Substance.”
36 For a discussion of Aristotle’s various treatments of the continuous, which influenced both 
positively and negatively Avicenna’s own understanding, see Glasner, “ibn Rushd’s Theory of Minima 
Naturalia,” 11.
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continuity, taken alone it can be disjointed in places. Fortunately, certain remarks 
that he makes about the continuum in a letter to the Vizier Abu¯ Saʿ d significantly 
smooth out the Physics discussion.37 Both texts observe that continuity (itti .sa¯l) is 
an equivocal notion, and in the Physics, Avicenna identifies three ways in which 
one might speak of the continuous.38 Two senses of ‘continuous’ are understood 
relative to something else (Avicenna mentions only one of these senses in his 
letter to Abu¯ Saʿ d), while the third concerns the continuous considered in itself.
one of the relative senses of being continuous identified in the Physics—the 
one omitted in the letter to Abu¯ Saʿ d—is said of an object inasmuch as it is moving. 
This form of continuity occurs, Avicenna tells us, when
. . . one side of the continuous thing is moved in a direction away from the other, 
the other follows it. . . . The two extremities can be two in actuality, and there can be 
something actually contiguous after adhering during the motion. The extremity of 
what is continuous and that with which it is continuous can be one, but it is termed 
continuous in the present sense not inasmuch as its extremity and that of the other 
are one, but only inasmuch as it follows it during the motion in the aforementioned 
way. (Avicenna, Physics, iii.2, 9)
Here continuity is relative to the motion. Thus, for example, if one considers 
a train, the engine, caboose, as well as any intervening boxcars do not share a 
common limit, and yet they move together such that relative to that motion one 
can say of them that they make up a continuous moving whole.
The second relative sense, which Avicenna considers, in both his Physics and 
the letter to Abu¯ Saʿ d, is the continuous relative to a limit (.taraf ), which he finds 
in Aristotle’s Physics 5.3 227a11–12, namely, “that whose limit is the same as a limit 
of something else.” This case occurs when something is continuous relative to a 
shared limit that is one and the same for two parts. (in his own Physics, Avicenna 
unfortunately gives the impression that there are two subspecies of this relative 
notion of continuity: absolute and accidental. in the letter to the Vizier Abu¯ Saʿ d, 
however, it is evident that the accidental continuity that Avicenna discusses in the 
Physics is in fact the continuous in itself.)39 An example of this second relative sense 
of being continuous is two lines forming an angle, since each line has one and the 
same common point at the angle’s vertex, and so can be said to be continuous 
relative to the limit according to Aristotle’s Physics 5.3 account of continuity. 
nonetheless, the two parts are actually distinct even though they share one and 
the same common limit.
Avicenna’s account of the continuous in itself, which he perhaps misleadingly 
also labels as accidental continuity, is, he tells us, “the definition that is mentioned in 
[Aristotle’s] Categories [6, 5a1–2], namely, ‘that for whose parts a common limit can 
be found at which they meet.’”40 in his Physics, Avicenna describes the continuous 
in itself as that magnitude that in itself has no parts (la¯ juz’ ),41 but in which one 
37 For the text and a French translation, see Avicenna, Letter to Abu¯ Sa‘d.
38 Avicenna, Physics, iii.2, 8–10.
39 Avicenna, Letter to Abu¯ Sa‘d, 42–44.
40 Avicenna, Letter to Abu¯ Sa‘d, 43.
41 The description of the continuous in itself having no parts is explicitly made at Avicenna, 
Physics, iii.3, 1.
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can posit limits in it in an accidental sense, a point to which i return shortly. The 
most obvious instance of parts that the continuous in itself must lack is that of 
physical parts, as in the case of, for example, the articulation of the bones of the 
arm, and, more generally, actual parts, as in the two sides of the angle mentioned 
above. Additionally, the continuous should not be thought to have even latent parts 
present within it waiting to emerge into actuality. This theory of latency (kumu¯n) is 
most commonly associated with ibrahim al-na.z.za¯m (c. 775–845). Avicenna clearly 
wants to distinguish his theory of continuity from al-na.z.za¯m’s, who believed that 
an actual infinity of parts are latent within a continuous object.42
For Avicenna, the continuous only ever has accidental parts, parts that result 
through a psychological act of positing accidental limits within the continuous 
object. Avicenna describes these accidental limits thus:
[They are] like what happens when our estimative faculty imagines or we posit two 
parts for a line that is actually one, where we distinguish one [part] from the other 
by positing. in that way, a limit is distinguished for [the line] that is the same as the 
limit of the other division. in that case, both are said to be continuous with each 
other. Each one, however, exists individually only as long as there is the positing, and 
so, when the positing ceases, there is no longer this and that [part]; rather, there is 
the unified whole that actually has no division within it. now, if what occurs through 
positing were to be something [really] existing in the thing itself and not [merely] 
by positing, then it would be possible for an actually infinite number of parts to exist 
within the body (as we shall explain), but this is absurd. (Physics, iii.2, 8)
Accidental limits thus occur within the continuous in itself when the single unified 
continuous whole is distinguished into two (or more) conceptual parts through 
some act of positing (far.d), such as pointing toward a uniform surface and saying, 
“this side,” while pointing to the right, and “that side,” while pointing to the left. 
The limit in this case—and Avicenna is adamant about this point—arises only as 
an accidental result of the positing, and in fact that limit ceases once the positing 
ceases.43 indeed, to maintain that the part still remains after the pointing stops, 
says Avicenna, is tantamount to saying that the pointing itself remains when the 
pointing has stopped. it is simply false, warns Avicenna, to think that the limit in 
this case really exists in the continuum.
Moreover, he warns his reader not to mistake the description (rasm) of the 
continuous in Aristotle’s De caelo (1.1, 268a5–6)44 which is given in terms of “that 
which can be divided into things always susceptible to [further] division,” as 
constituting the essence (ma¯hīya) of the continuous in itself.45 in other words, it 
is not the essence of the continuous to have a potential infinity of divisions within 
it. instead, this description is at most a concomitant of the continuous, which must 
be demonstrated to belong to it necessarily. in other words, one must be careful 
even when one speaks of potential limits inhering within the continuous in itself, 
if by ‘potential’ one means, again, something latent within the continuum waiting 
to be actualized.
42 For a discussion of al-na.z.za¯m and his theories, see Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kala¯m, ch. ii and Vi. 
43 Avicenna reiterates this point in even stronger terms at Physics, iii.5, 3.
44 Also see Aristotle, Physics, 6.2, 232b24–5.
45 Avicenna, Letter to Abu¯ Sa‘d, 43; and Avicenna, Physics, iii.2, 8.
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Avicenna takes up the issue of a continuous magnitude and its divisibility 
(inqisa¯m) in earnest at Physics iii.9. Here we learn that “the magnitude . . . in fact 
is the continuity itself, not some continuous thing resulting from a continuity in 
[in the magnitude].”46 While this claim is part of a technical discussion concerning 
matter, in general, Avicenna wants to deny that prime matter considered 
independent of any form has a magnitude of itself, to which the property of being 
continuous is then superadded.47 instead, for Avicenna, matter is a body owing 
to the form of corporeality, and the body’s being a continuous magnitude is due 
to that form of corporeality.
As for the divisibility of the magnitude, he unequivocally identifies two senses 
in which one speaks of divisibility.
one of them is [in the literal sense of] discontinuity and becoming separated, which 
follows upon quantity owing to the preparedness of the matter. The other sense of 
divisibility is that it is in the nature of the thing that one thing in it is posited as different 
from some other thing and so on without coming to an end, which essentially follows 
upon magnitude. . . . The first [sense] is true divisibility, namely, what changes the 
state of the thing, whereas the second is only a function of the estimative faculty 
[mawhu¯m]. (Physics, iii.9, 3)
For Avicenna, there is, clearly, “physical divisibility” and “conceptual divisibility.” 
The first and true sense of divisibility for Avicenna, that is, physical divisibility, is 
the form of division that actually brings about a separation and discontinuity within 
the magnitude. it involves physically dividing a magnitude into two actually distinct 
parts, and in so doing destroying the continuity and so the original magnitude 
itself.48
The second type of division, namely, conceptual divisibility, involves only the 
accidental partition of the magnitude. The parts involved in this type of divisibility 
are the accidental parts noted above that result from a certain psychological 
process, namely, division through mere positing. in the present discussion, 
Avicenna throws additional light on his conception of the continuous, for we now 
learn that within the magnitude there is merely a preparedness (isti‘da¯d) for being 
divided, and “that preparedness need not belong to a form, for it is not the case that 
what acts must do so in itself.”49 The notion of preparedness or receptivity is one of 
Avicenna’s preferred descriptions for matter (hayu¯lá). Since for Avicenna matter 
has no formal or positive feature of its own, the preparedness of the magnitude 
almost certainly means that there is nothing about the underlying matter that 
prevents the magnitude’s being divided infinitely. Thus, to the question, “Why is 
a continuous magnitude infinitely divisible?” the answer is, “Because the matter of 
the continuous magnitude does not prevent its being so divided.” The process of 
division ceases only if one terminates the dividing process because, for instance, 
there is no fitting tool, or the one doing the dividing could not go on, or some 
form in addition to the form of corporeality prevents its being further divided.50 
46 Avicenna, Physics, iii.9, 3; also see Physics, iii.2, 8–10, and al-Maqu¯la¯t, iii.4.
47 For an overview of the classical context to Avicenna’s claim, see Sorabji, Matter, Space, & Mo-
tion, i. Matter, esp. sections 1–3; and De Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of Matter, ch. 2, sect. iii.
48 Avicenna, Physics, iii.9, 3.
49 Avicenna, Physics, iii.9, 4.
50 Avicenna, Physics, iii.3, 1.
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it is not because the body as such is insusceptible to physical divisions as small as 
one likes. The preparedness of matter, then, plays the role of the middle term in 
demonstrating the infinite divisibility of a continuum, which we saw him mention 
at Physics iii.2.
Moreover, the reference to preparedness is another way to emphasize that 
there are no real or formal parts within a continuous magnitude; for matter is 
wholly passive and considered independent of any form that could not bring 
about any formal features in a thing. instead, it is again the estimative faculty’s 
positing accidental limits—and so accidental parts within a continuum as small 
as one likes—that accounts even for the accidental parts within a continuum. 
in short, a continuum’s infinite divisibility refers to a potentially never-ending 
psychological process, not to some formal feature(s) actually existing within the 
magnitude itself.51
Since Avicenna has now introduced the estimative faculty (wahm) and its product 
on multiple occasions to explain the continuous in itself, and the continuum’s 
being described as potentially infinitely divisible, a brief word is warranted about 
his notion of estimation.52 The estimative faculty is one of Avicenna’s celebrated 
internal senses, whose function is to receive the connotational attributes (sing. 
ma‘ná) inherent in material objects. A connotational attribute is a non-sensible 
property or quality of a sensible or material object. The classic example is the 
sheep’s perception of the ferocity of the wolf. For while the sheep can see the long 
claws and teeth of the wolf as well as smell its scent and hear its growl, none of 
the external senses perceive the wolf’s ferocity itself. Yet in some sense the sheep 
perceives that ferocity. it is the estimative faculty that perceives this connotational 
attribute of ferocity. More importantly for our story, the estimative faculty is 
that power by which imagination (mutakhayyila) combines and divides both 
sensible forms and connotational attributes.53 now, within his Physics, Avicenna’s 
preferred language for perceiving temporal and spatial relations as well as setting 
up thought experiments that cannot in principle be done—like imagining the 
infinite divisibility of a continuum—is always that of wahm and its cognates. Thus, 
the role of the estimative faculty in understanding the continuum is literally to 
imagine parts within a magnitude in which those parts simply are not present in 
any way whatsoever, save as accidental concomitances of the estimative faculty’s 
act of positing.
Before turning to Avicenna’ account proper of minima naturalia, let me conclude 
this section by saying something about Avicenna’s adamant, almost paranoid, 
denial that the continuous in itself has anything like parts or latent divisions.54 
To help contextualize Avicenna’s account of continuity, it must be noted that the 
mutakallimu¯n, that is, Muslim (speculative) theologians, had viciously attacked 
the philosophers’ notion of the continuum and precisely on the point that the 
51 See Avicenna, Physics, iii.2, 8; iii.5, 3; and iii.9, 3–4.
52 For specialized discussions of Avicenna’s theory of the estimative faculty, see Black, “Estimation 
(Wahm) in Avicenna,” and Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, ii.4, “Estimation and ‘inten-
tions,’” 127–53; and for a general overview see McGinnis, Avicenna, 113–16.
53 For a discussion of the (compositive) imagination, see Black, “Rational imagination: Avicenna 
on the cogitative Power.”
54 The following is drawn from McGinnis, “Avicenna’s natural Philosophy,” §2, 78.
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essence of the continuum is its potential infinite divisibility. These kala¯m thinkers 
simply noted that in order for something to be truly potential, there must be a 
corresponding power that can actualize that potential, whether it is the finite 
power of some created thing or the infinite power of God.55 Thus, the objection 
continues, if a continuum were to exist, and if something is continuous if and 
only if it has a potentially infinite number of divisions inherent in it, then, to the 
extent that a continuum purportedly has a true potential for infinite divisibility, 
there must be some power that can actualize the potential infinity of divisions. 
if that potential is actualized, however, an actual infinity of divisions would be 
possible, for just let the corresponding power actualize the infinity of potential 
divisions, in which case there would actually be an infinity of divisions. According 
to the Aristotelians’ own position, however, an actual infinity is impossible. What 
gave rise to this impossibility, the mutakallimu¯n maintain, is only the doctrine of a 
potential infinity and an analysis of true potential. Thus, the objection concludes, 
the purported infinite divisibility associated with a continuum simply is not 
something truly potential, and so must be rejected along with the accompanying 
notion of a continuum.
As we have seen, however, infinite divisibility does not make up the essence 
of a continuum, according to Avicenna, but is only a description of it that must 
be demonstrated. Moreover, as we have also seen, for Avicenna the infinite 
divisibility of a continuum refers to the psychological process of positing limits 
within a continuous magnitude, and that process is in principle never-ending. Thus, 
contra the mutakallimu¯n, Avicenna can say that were this process ever completely 
actualized, then a process that in principle can go on without end must necessarily 
have come to an end, a blatant contradiction now on the part of the detractors 
of the continuous. Avicenna has safeguarded the possibility of continua from the 
attacks of the atomists.
4 .  a v i c e n n a  o n  t h e  m i n i m a  n a t u r a l i a
Throughout his discussions of continuity and infinity, Avicenna keeps hinting at 
the possibility of various natural kinds having some physical limit of divisibility, 
which cannot be trespassed if the same natural substance is still to remain.56 At 
Physics iii.12, Avicenna finally takes up the issue of minima naturalia in earnest. 
interestingly, the Latin translators of Avicenna’s Physics stopped translating the 
Physics at iii.10—no doubt in part, if not in full, because Avicenna provides some 
of his most thorough and trenchant arguments for the eternity of the cosmos 
there, a topic that the church Schoolmen would have wanted to avoid.57 Whatever 
the reasons for stopping at iii.10, the end result is that neither medieval Latin 
philosophers nor modern historians of science have recognized or appreciated 
Avicenna’s developed theory of minima naturalia.58
55 See Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kala¯m, 469–70; and Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kala¯m, 152–59.
56 See, for example, Avicenna, Physics, iii.6, 4 and iii.9, 4.
57 Since the Latin translators relegated chapter 1 to a prologue, the numbering of the Latin 
chapters is off by one when compared with the Arabic. Thus, the Arabic Physics, iii.10 (the last chapter 
translated into Latin) corresponds with the Latin Physics, iii.9.
58 A further effect was that neither medieval scholastics nor contemporary historians of science 
have fully appreciated Avicenna’s theory of mixture, for it presupposes his theory of minima naturalia, 
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Avicenna begins Physics iii.12, which treats not only minima naturalia, but 
also the related issues of whether there is a naturally smallest motion as well as a 
naturally fastest and a naturally slowest motion, with the following lines:
it is proper to add to these chapters [namely, those on continuous and atomic 
magnitudes] an investigation into the continuous preservation of the forms belonging 
to bodies and whether they retain [their forms] while being divided infinitely. in 
other words, just as bodies are infinitely divisible with respect to smallness and yet 
preserve the form of corporeality, do they likewise preserve the rest of the forms 
that they have—as, for example, [the substantial forms of] being water, air, and the 
like? (Physics, iii.12, 1)
The issue of divisibility is raised again, but now Avicenna takes it as proven that a 
body as such is infinitely divisible with respect to its corporeality or being a body. 
This conclusion follows from his earlier discussion of continuity and division. one 
needs simply add the premise that for Avicenna being a body is nothing more than 
being a three-dimensional magnitude.59 That is because to speak of magnitude 
just is to speak of the continuous. Moreover, as we saw, a continuous magnitude 
is infinitely divisible, since nothing prevents its being divided. Therefore, a body 
as such is likewise infinitely divisible. Such a conclusion is obviously the case for 
conceptual divisibility, but it equally holds for physical divisibility; for again there 
is nothing about the matter that would prevent the divisions, and while infinite 
divisibility is not the essence of a continuous magnitude, it still necessarily follows 
upon being a continuous magnitude.
The question Avicenna poses, then, is whether forms other than the form of 
corporeality can likewise weather such divisions. These other forms are the species 
forms—that is, the forms that make a given substance the natural kind that it 
is—and the “forms that belong to [bodies] on account of mixture [miza¯j]”—as, 
for example, flesh, blood, and the like.60 Avicenna immediately clarifies that the 
present discussion is not about the conceptual divisibility that is the product of 
the estimative faculty, although he does return to it again in the present chapter. 
instead, the primary focus is about the divisions that seemingly reduce mixtures 
to their underlying constituents.61
The introduction of the forms of mixtures is significant because, recall, one 
of the other important places where later commentators found material relevant 
to minima naturalia is in Aristotle’s discussion of mixture (mixis/krama). Avicenna 
is thus developing an integrated theory of minima naturalia, and in so doing he 
recognizes that it must also account for mixtures.62 Since the notion of mixture is a 
technical one in ancient and medieval science, a few words about it are warranted.63
and the objections raised against it arise precisely from an ignorance of his theory of minima naturalia; 
see Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 3–140, esp. 27–28.
59 Avicenna, Kit¯ab al-Burha¯n, i.10, 49; Physics, i.2, 2–4; and Metaphysics, ii.2 (all). 
60 Avicenna, Physics, iii.12, 2.
61 Avicenna, Physics, iii.12, 2.
62 For a discussion of Avicenna’s theory of mixture, see Stone, “Avicenna’s Theory of Primary 
Mixture.”
63 The locus classicus is once again Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption 1.10; other passages 
include History of Animals 1.1, 487a2–10 and 1.3, 511b1–10; Parts of Animals 1.2, 640b18–29 and 2.2, 
647b10–30; and Generation of Animals 2.6, 743a1–36. Equally important for understanding the ancient 
and medieval theory of mixture, particularly as it relates to medicine, is Galen’s On Mixtures (Peri Kraseo¯s). 
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A mixture is best contrasted with generation/corruption and combination. in 
the case of generation and corruption, the initial ingredients become corrupted, 
that is, they completely cease to be and something totally new emerges. As such, 
the initial ingredients simply cannot be recovered. For example, once a loaf of 
bread has come to be, it is impossible to recover from the loaf the flour, water, salt, 
and yeast that were its initial ingredients. in contrast, in a mixture, while the initial 
ingredients are no longer actually present in the mixture, they are potentially there 
and so in principle can be recovered. Because in a mixture, the ingredients are 
no longer actually present but only potentially present, mixtures also differ from 
mere combinations, like in a blend of cornmeal and flour. in a combination the 
parts remain actually present and so the combination is not uniform throughout; 
cornmeal, for example, might be adjacent to flour. While much more can be 
said about the ancient and medieval theory of mixture, the previous two points 
suffice: one, the mixture must be uniform throughout; and, two, the ingredients 
of a mixture must be recoverable.64
Returning to Avicenna’s argument for minima naturalia, while he accepts their 
existence in both the cases of mixtures and the simple elemental bodies (like 
earth, air, etc.), he does not appear to be impressed with Aristotle’s Physics 1.4 
argument. Recall that Aristotle reasoned that if there were not minima naturalia, 
then the various natural kinds could be indefinitely small or large, but he also 
assumed that it was impossible for there to be indefinitely small and large natural 
kinds. Thus, Aristotle concluded that there must be minima naturalia in order to 
avoid this impossibility.
Although Avicenna does not say so explicitly, he seems to be uncomfortable 
with the gratuitous assumption that the existence of indefinitely small or large 
natural kinds is impossible. Remember that Philoponus too seemed to have 
reservations about this assumption, and even went so far as to suggest a proof 
for it. Again, Philoponus claimed that forms become attenuated when forced 
to spread throughout greater and greater magnitudes, and so there must be a 
natural maximum. He then went on simply to assert that, just as there must be a 
natural maximum, so must there be a natural minimum. Unfortunately, it is not 
clear why this conclusion follows, since in the case of minima, there is no longer 
the attenuation of forms, which was the key element in Philoponus’s proof for 
natural maximums.
in Avicenna’s first pass at Aristotle’s argument, which in fact is a fairly free 
commentary on the Physics 1.4 passage, he attempts to reconstruct it without the 
troubling premise.
if this possibility concerning the generation of animals from their elements were 
a real one [that is, if one can extract out from the underlying mixture (imtiza¯j) 
indefinitely small amounts], not only would it be an absolute possibility, but also it 
would be a possibility that for the most part refers to what exists. That is because the 
mixture of the lesser part precedes the mixture of the greater part, for the greater 
part takes in the lesser part. The same holds for the account concerning composition 
[i.e. substances other than the elements]. it is more fitting that what is before should 
64 For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s theory of mixture see Frede, “On Generation and Corrup-
tion i.10: on Mixture and Mixables.”
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exist than what is after, and so it is more fitting that mixtures from the smallest parts 
should exist. in that case, elephants the size of cats (to say nothing of the size of 
gnats!) would not have been so rare as to verge on the impossible. (Physics, iii.12, 3)
Here we learn that the smaller mixture is prior to the larger mixture inasmuch as 
the greater mixture takes in the smaller, but not conversely. Presumably, Avicenna 
means something, for example, like this: While one can have a milliliter of some 
mixture without having a liter, one cannot have a liter of the mixture without 
having a milliliter. The milliliter goes into making up a liter in a way that the liter 
cannot go into making up the milliliter. He then continues that since it is more 
fitting that the prior exists than the posterior, and the smaller is prior to the greater 
in the sense explained, then if there are no natural minima, “unnaturally” small 
kinds should exist like cat-sized elephants or even gnat-sized elephants. of course 
it is an empirical fact that we only ever experience various natural kinds within 
a certain definite range of sizes, and yet again preternaturally small instances of 
the various kinds should be the norm if there were not minima naturalia. Thus, 
Avicenna concludes that the mixtures making up the various natural kinds cannot 
be indefinitely small but have a natural minimum.
Avicenna’s second reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument focuses on the formal 
cause.65 He claims in that argument that the mixture alone may not be sufficient for 
the occurrence of the species form and that a further condition may be necessary 
as well, namely that, the magnitude must be of sufficient size. The reason, he says, is 
that the proper function of the species form is to cause the various activities proper 
to the species, and it may turn out that these activities can only be performed if 
the body is of a certain size. Thus, he writes,
An example, then, is the fact that a human will be incapable of doing those things 
characteristic of a human unless his body is such as to perform human activities 
adequately. not the least of [these activities] are that he have a power [qu¯wa] [that 
is, the form of human] and a tool [that is, a body] by means of which he can seek out 
and make a home (assuming there is no impediment), and by which he can fashion 
clothes, and [do] everything else a human must do to exist, as well as not being such 
that strong winds blow him about as so much dust and that the predominating lower 
qualities in him [namely, hot, cold, wet, and dry] do not change him. (Physics, iii.12, 5)
Avicenna maintains that merely having the right kind of mixture, regardless of how 
small, is not enough to explain the occurrence of a given species form. The species 
form requires some natural minimum magnitude if that form is to produce the 
various species-appropriate activities identified with being a certain kind. As i noted 
earlier, Philoponus’s attenuation argument for a natural maximum and minimum 
magnitude is better suited to a maximum magnitude than a minimum magnitude. 
The present argument seems ideally suited to make up for this weakness, since 
Avicenna’s point is precisely that the power of a form becomes inefficacious if 
there is not a natural minimum magnitude in which that form subsists. This point 
becomes all the more germane in light of the fact that in places Avicenna identifies 
the power (qu¯wa) with the form itself.66
65 Avicenna, Physics, iii.12, 5.
66 See Avicenna, On Generation and Corruption, 6, 127.
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Having offered his commentary and improvements on Aristotle’s Physics 1.4 
text, Avicenna turns to his own understanding of the minima naturalia, which relies 
heavily upon Philoponus’s earlier comments as well as on Aristotle’s On Generation 
and Corruption 1.10 and the commentary tradition surrounding that work.67 He 
begins by reminding us that division is said in two ways: one that brings about an 
actual division, severance, or fragmentation of the magnitude, namely, physical 
division, and a second that involves a mere mental division or positing that leaves 
the magnitude intact, namely, conceptual division.
concerning conceptual division, Avicenna is certain that there is no smallest 
conceptual part. interestingly, instead of simply appealing to his earlier critique 
of atomism to make this point, he offers a different refutation of it, reminiscent of 
the “mathematicians’ objection” noted by Philoponus, but now Avicenna turns that 
argument to his own advantage. on the strength of his earlier arguments, Avicenna 
takes as given that the form of a specific natural kind must “spread throughout 
the whole of [the body] with which it corresponds.”68 in other words, when 
one considers, for example, some mixture such as flesh, the form of flesh must 
spread throughout that mixture uniformly such that the flesh is a homogeneous 
homoeomery, that is, every part is the same throughout as the whole.
Since the present argument is about conceptual divisions, a brief comment 
on Avicenna’s notion of conception (ta.sawwur) is warranted. For Avicenna, x is 
conceivable, that is, one has a genuine concept of x, just in case there exists in 
one’s intellect the corresponding intelligible for x, that is, the essence of x stripped 
of any material concomitants. A true intelligible, in contrast to some whim of the 
imagination or a vain intelligible, then, must correspond with some truly existing 
thing; otherwise, while one might be imagining x, one is not truly conceiving x. 
For example, while one might be able to form an image of a unicorn, that mere 
image is not the same as an intelligible concept of what a unicorn is—that is, of 
the essence of unicorn—and so the notion of a unicorn is a vain intelligible and 
so not truly conceivable, even if it is imaginable. This notion of conceivability 
underlies Avicenna’s argument that there is no conceptual limit to the divisibility 
of homogeneous homoeomeries, such as elements and mixtures.
His argument is a reductio. Again, he takes the reality of homogeneous 
homoeomeries as given. next, assume that there is a conceptual limit to their 
divisibility. in that case, if there were sufficiently miniscule magnitudes of which 
it is inconceivable that a given species form—whether an elemental form or the 
form of a mixture—can be found in that magnitude, then in those intervals either 
no body exists or a body of a different kind exists.
if some parts of the body were not to have their fair share of its form on account of 
their smallness, there would be an interval [bu‘d] of parts alike in [that] status [that 
is, in not having that form] such that either the body would cease or parts smaller 
than them (and less likely to bear that form) would remain. in the [latter] case, 
67 While it is obvious that Avicenna is responding to the commentary tradition surrounding On 
Generation and Corruption, only after a close comparison of Avicenna’s own work with Philoponus’s 
Greek commentary and the extant Arabic fragments of Alexander could one even begin to assess 
either the novelty of Avicenna’s position or the degree of his indebtedness to the earlier tradition.
68 Avicenna, Physics, iii.12, 6.
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this body would be an ordered series of parts, none of which have this form. This 
form occurs only through the collection of [these parts], where the collection qua 
collection provides nothing but number and its properties, while qua a collection 
of bodies, it provides nothing beyond what the collection provides absolutely, save 
magnitude and its concomitants of shape and position. now, none of that is fiery 
or earthy, not even in the parts taken separately nor in the whole of the collection. 
(Avicenna, Physics, iii.12, 6)
The argument, which takes the form of destructive dilemma, is dense, and needs 
to be unpacked. The assumption to be rejected is that there are sufficiently small 
divisions that cannot even be conceived of sustaining, for example, the form of 
fire or flesh. in that case, assuming the conceptual division has been made, there 
is an interval in which either there is no form at all, or there is some form other 
than that of fire or flesh. The division is exhaustive, since the division leads either 
(1) to what has no form or (2) to what has some form, and the in-formed thing 
can be either (2a) something with the same kind of form or (2b) something with a 
different kind of form. Avicenna does not explicitly mention option (2a) because 
the assumption to be rejected by reductio is that one has reached a division where 
the existence of the initial form is no longer conceivable. 
As for option (1), namely, that there is a formless interval, Avicenna dismisses 
it without comment, but his reason for doing so is easy enough to surmise. First, 
it is not clear how the whole substance would exist, if at the micro-level nothing 
is actual; for the form is the actuality of the substance, and yet it is being assumed 
that no form exists below a certain magnitude. in short, it was taken as given 
that a certain homogeneous homoeomery was actual, but it now seems that it is 
not actual, a contradiction. Second, and assuming that the present option allows 
some sense in which the whole substance exits, the language of ‘interval’ (bu‘d), 
and particularly a formless interval, is Avicenna’s preferred language for a void 
(khala¯’). At Physics ii.8, however, Avicenna had undertaken a detailed analysis and 
critique of the idea of void and found it empty, or more precisely, found it to be 
a vain intelligible. His criticism included interstitial voids too, and it may well be 
just such interstitial voids that the present option would allow.69 Thus, this option 
leads to a known absurdity, namely, the existence of a void, and so there is no 
corresponding intelligible. As such, however, such a conceptual division in which 
there is a purported empty interval is inconceivable in the sense outlined above, 
and so the interval must be conceived to have some form.
As for the second option, namely, that these conceptually small magnitudes are 
conceived to have a form other than that of fire and flesh, the larger magnitude 
of “fire” or “flesh” above this threshold would be nothing more than an ordered 
series or mere collection of parts, forming a heap but not a kind, like fire or flesh. 
in fact, on the current view, natural bodies would be no different from aggregates 
of atoms, none of which is flesh or fire. in effect, if there were limits on how small 
conceptual division could be, homoeomerous or uniform mixtures would be 
impossible, but the existence of homogeneous homoeomeries was taken as given 
and shown to be not only possible but also necessarily so in the early parts of book 
69 it is perhaps also worth noting that Philoponus considered the idea of a “conceptual void” intel-
ligible in a way that Avicenna did not; see McGinnis, “A Penetrating Question in the History of ideas.”
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iii of his Physics, and so there is a contradiction. of course, it is impossible to have 
an intelligible that corresponds with a contradiction, and so again this horn of the 
dilemma is inconceivable given Avicenna’s notion of conceivability. conceptual 
divisibility ad infinitum is possible for Avicenna precisely because, upon reflection, 
the mind recoils from the idea that it cannot conceive of indefinitely small divisions 
of homogeneous homoeomeries.
As for physical divisibility, Avicenna contends that, unlike conceptual divisibility, 
there is in fact a natural minimum beyond which a given body is no longer able to 
preserve its species form. Avicenna now provides, as far as i can tell, a new proof 
for the necessity of minima naturalia. He argues thus:
Whenever bodies become smaller, they are increasingly disposed to being more 
quickly acted upon by other [bodies]. . . . So, apparently, when the body exceeds its 
degree of smallness and separates off from its collective kind, it would be impossible 
for it to retain its form at that time; but, rather, as a result of the bodies surrounding 
it, it will undergo alteration into them and become continuous with them. As such 
it will not maintain its form until mixed. (Physics, iii.12, 8)
The argument is based upon, but not identical to, comments Aristotle makes at 
On Generation and Corruption 1.10, 328a18–35. Aristotle’s text treats the possible 
reciprocal activity and passivity of substances in which it is mentioned in passing 
that the smaller the quantities the more easily they mix with one another. 
Additionally, in his commentary on this passage, Philoponus glosses Aristotle’s 
remarks, saying, “forms are bound to a certain quantity in order to subsist, as was 
said in the Physics.”70 What is important to note is that while Philoponus appeals 
to minima naturalia (whose existence was purportedly proven in Physics 1.4) to 
explain Aristotle’s comments, Avicenna turns Aristotle’s comments into a new 
argument for minima naturalia.
concerning the details of Avicenna’s argument, ‘collective kind,’ as used in 
this passage, translates the Arabic ‘kullīya,’ which, at least within the context of 
Avicenna’s natural philosophy, is his preferred locution for the various elemental 
spheres of earth, water, air, and fire. Thus, in order to appreciate Avicenna’s 
argument fully, i must briefly treat his understanding of the elements and 
substantial change, that is, change from being one kind of substance into being 
another kind of substance.
Associated with each of the traditional four elements are two primary qualities, 
one each from two sets of couplets. These couplets include the qualities hot/cold 
and wet/dry.71 Thus, the element earth is a predominately cold-dry mixture, water 
is a predominately cold-wet mixture, air is a predominately hot-wet mixture, and 
fire is a predominately hot-dry mixture. For Avicenna, these primary qualities are 
related to the elements’ material cause. now, when these primary qualities are 
altered—as, for example, when there is an increase or decrease in the degree of 
hotness, coldness, dryness, or wetness—the alteration prepares or predisposes a 
given element’s matter so that it is suited to receive a new substantial form.72 So, 
70 Philoponus, In Phys., 198, 18–19.
71 Avicenna, On Generation and Corruption, 9, 154–55.
72 The story is much more complex than i suggest here. it involves Avicenna’s distinction be-
tween physical causation and metaphysical causation with its appeal to his celebrated Giver of Forms 
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for example, when water, which again is a cold-wet mixture, is sufficiently heated, 
the underlying qualitative disposition becomes no longer suited to the substantial 
form of water, and so at some point in the heating process the mixture receives 
a new substantial form that is compatible with the new underlying disposition, 
namely, it receives the form of air. And, indeed, the steam produced from vigorously 
heating water does have a definite air-like quality.
Bearing this account of the elements and substantial change in mind, we can 
now better appreciate Avicenna’s proof for the existence of minima naturalia. The 
smaller the quantity of a given substance is, observes Avicenna, the more apt it is 
to be acted upon by surrounding bodies. This is the point that Avicenna draws 
from On Generation and Corruption 1.10. So, for example, all things being equal, it 
takes longer for a body of water to cool down a ton of molten iron than for that 
same body of water to cool down an ounce of molten iron, and similarly, a blast 
furnace is able to heat the same ounce more quickly than the ton. So, again, for 
Avicenna the smaller the physical divisions of a given substance are, the more 
disposed the resulting reduced quantity of the substance becomes to the primary 
qualities—again, hot, cold, wet, and dry—of the surrounding bodies. Below a 
certain limit, maintains Avicenna, the ratio between the strength of the primary 
qualities of the surrounding body and those of the body being divided is such 
that the qualities of the surrounding body overcome those of the divided body. 
At that moment, the divided substance’s underlying mixture becomes no longer 
suitable for its elemental form, and the mixture receives a new substantial form.
So, for example, imagine a cup of water that is surrounded by hot summer 
air. now, imagine half the amount of water, and then keep taking halves. At 
some point, the amount of water is so small that the water simply evaporates as 
it were instantaneously, or, as Avicenna would have it, the form of water in that 
minuscule physical quantity is immediately replaced with the form of air. in short, 
for Avicenna, the elements, as well as more complex mixtures like blood, flesh, 
and bone, have natural minima beyond which they cannot be divided and still be 
capable of retaining their species form; for the hot, cold, wet, and dry qualities 
of the surrounding bodies so alter that divided body that it is no longer suitable 
for sustaining its initial form. There must be, Avicenna thus concludes, minima 
naturalia. in this respect, Avicenna’s minima naturalia are more like our modern 
notion of atoms than classical Greek and medieval islamic accounts of atoms are. 
That is because if one takes a certain quantity of hydrogen, for example, and divides 
it, one is still left with hydrogen, that is, until one reaches a single hydrogen atom; 
for when a single hydrogen atom is divided, it is no longer hydrogen but a proton 
and an electron. The “form” of hydrogen is, as it were, lost. While not exact, at 
least in certain respects the analogy between minima naturalia and modern atoms 
is, then, apropos.
(Wa¯hib al- .suwar); see Janssens, “The notions of ‘Wa¯hib al- .suwar’ (Giver of Forms) and ‘Wa¯hib al-‘aql ’ 
(Bestower of intelligence) in ibn Sīna¯,” and Hasse, “Avicenna’s ‘Giver of Forms’ in Latin Philosophy, 
Especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus.” Additionally, his account of substantial change requires 
an understanding of his critique of earlier theories of substantial forms, particularly how his compet-
ing view of substantial form comes to play in his account of elemental change; see, Stone, “Avicenna’s 
Theory of Primary Mixture, ” 109–19; and Richards, “Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and Generation.”
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i end this section with one final observation: Avicenna’s theory of minima 
naturalia is a small mixture of Physics 1.4 and On Generation and Corruption 1.10. 
As such, Avicenna’s theory of natural minima anticipates at many points his theory 
of mixture developed in his own On Generation and Corruption 6. Two points in 
particular are salient. Recall that for Avicenna, when there are quantities of either 
the elements or mixtures that are equal to or greater than the naturally minimum 
quantity required for the substantial form, the form spreads uniformly throughout 
the substance such that the substance is a continuous whole. inasmuch as there 
is a continuous whole, one can conceptually divide the substance as small as one 
likes, even below the naturally minimum quantity, and the substance remains 
uniform throughout. it is only when the substance is physically divided such that 
the parts are literally separated from one another that the mixture is destroyed 
and the ingredients of the mixture emerge once again. Thus, Avicenna’s theory 
of minima naturalia with its reliance on two types of divisibility not only lets him 
account for the uniformity of mixtures, but also provides him with the mechanism 
for explaining recoverability, which again were two of Aristotle’s desiderata for a 
true mixture.73
in conclusion, until relatively recently the theory of a natural minimum was 
considered to be primarily the product of Latin Schoolmen working from a number 
of germinal statements in Aristotle. Recently, Ruth Glasner and others have shown 
that, despite the limited knowledge that medieval churchmen and historians of 
science have had concerning Averroes’s theory of minima naturalia, he in fact had 
a very developed account in which he grappled with both interpretative problems 
within Aristotle and substantive philosophical issues. Hopefully, i have shown that 
Averroes was not the only philosopher in the Arabic world working on this issue, 
and that Avicenna was at least as vigorously engaged in the issue of minima naturalia. 
Moreover, i strongly suspect that Avicenna’s work may have strongly influenced 
Averroes’s own reading of Aristotle. Finally, i doubt that Avicenna and Averroes 
were the sole thinkers within the medieval Arabic tradition of neoplatonized 
Aristotelian philosophy to undertake this endeavor. Thus, what still waits to be 
written is the full story of falsafa’s contribution to the history of atomism.
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